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WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1953
standards is that the union must comply with the procedural require-
ments set forth in its constitution and by-laws.' The case of Mahoney
v. Sailors' Union of the Pacifics again emphasized that the court will
look behind the union determination of such a question. The court there
held, contrary to the union tribunal, that the determination of the
situs of a trial for disciplinary action was not done in compliance with
the procedure of.the union constitution. In Minch v. Local Union No.
370, Etc,"0 it was held proper to submit to the jury the evidence that
Minch, the union member, was expelled by less than the number of
votes required and that after the union trial and pending appeal he was
not reinstated to union membership after payment of his fine and cur-
rent dues, both in violation of the union constitutional provisions. Thus
the court in effect rejected the union's contention that the union trial
was a matter of internal discipline, not a de novo matter in the trial
court.
Likewise, the substantive questions of union law, like the compliance
with procedural requirements, will be determined by the court de novo
and the determination by the union tribunal will in no way be con-
trolling." In the Mahoney case 2 the court held that the union's find-
ings of grounds for expulsion were unfounded. "The charge being
insufficient, the proceedings based upon it was a nullity and plaintiff's
expulsion was void.. u8
ROBERT S. MUCKLESTONE
LEGAL PROFESSION
Contingent Fee Contract in Divorce Action-Disciplinary Action.
The Washington court, in In re Smith, has held that it is a violation
of the ethics of the profession for an attorney to enter into a contingent
fee contract in a divorce action. This was the first time a court had
heard enjoined); Furniture Workers' Union Local 1007 v. United Brotherhood of
Carpenters & Joiners, 6 Wn.2d 654, 108 P.2d 651 (1940).
s Johnson v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners, 52 Nev. 400, 288 Pac. 170
(1930).
s 143 Wash. Dec. 803, 264 P.2d 1095 (1953), rehearing granted, 144 Wash. Dec. 497
(1954). See Wollett and Lampman, The Law of Union Factionalism-The Case of the
Sailors, 4 STAr;. L. REv. 177 (1952)
10 144 Wash. Dec. 14, 265 P.2d 286 (1953).
It Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N.Y. 277, 177 N.E. 833 (1931) ; Leo v. Local Union No. 612
of Int'l Union of Operating Engineers, 26 Wn.2d 498, 174 P2d 523 (1946).
12 Supra note 8.
1s Supra note 8 at 1097.
142 Wn.2d 188, 254 P.2d 464 (1953). The agreement entered into with his client
entitled the attorney to twenty per cent of all sums which might be received by his
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made such a finding in a disciplinary action.2
In England, contingent fee contracts, in any type of proceeding, are
unlawful.' Although this view initially prevailed in this country, con-
tingent fee contracts are now generally accepted and are widely used
in the field of personal injury actions.' Contingent fee contracts are
held not to violate Canon 10 of the Canons of Legal Ethics,' which
precludes a lawyer from acquiring an interest in ligitation which he is
conducting, and are expressly allowed by Canon 13, subject to several
conditions.
A contract for a contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be reason-
able under all the circumstances of the case, including the risk and uncer-
tainty of the compensation, but should always be subject to the supervision
of a court, as to its reasonableness. 8
It has been held in Washington that the statute permitting the compen-
ation of attorneys to be fixed by the agreement of the parties allows
contingent fee contracts.! None of the Washington cases construing
the statute involve a contingent fee contract in a divorce case,8 but it
is the almost universal rule in other jurisdictions that an attorney-client
contingent fee contract in a divorce action is unlawful and unenforcible
as against public policy. The underlying basis for such decisions is
that "public policy is interested in maintaining the family relation...
and that society demands a reconciliation, if practicable or possible."'
Therefore, it is not fitting that an attorney's interest should benefit by
client as a result of the divorce proceeding, in addition to the amount of fees he would
be allowed by the opposing side.
2 In In re Carleton, 33 Mont. 431, 84 Pac. 788 (1906), a disbarment proceeding, the
attorney was found guilty of conduct constituting moral turpitude. Among other acts,
he had entered into a contract with his client in a divorce proceeding entitling him to
one-fourth of the sum awarded as alimony. However, the suspension was not based on
the ground that the attorney had entered into the contract, but rather on the ground
that he had failed to disclose the existence of the contract to the court in the divorce
action.
3 AXTELL, CONTINGENT FEE, LEGAL AID AND ETHIcs 2 (1950).
4DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 176 (1953).
CANNON OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 10, 34A Wn.2d 129.
o CANNON OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 13, 34A Wn.2d 130.
7Smits v. Hogan, 35 Wash. 290, 77 Pac. 390 (1904) ; Weed v. Foster, 58 Wash. 675,
109 Pac. 123 (1910) ; Delbridge v. Beach, 66 Wash. 416, 119 Pac. 856 (1912) ; Beck v.
Boucher, 114 Wash. 574, 195 Pac. 996 (1921) ; Hamlin v. Case & Case, Inc., 188 Wash.
150, 61 P.2d 1287 (1936).
8 In Delbridge v. Beach, 66 Wash. 416, 119 Pac. 856 (1912), the contract in issue
provided, in the matter of compensation, that the attorney's fee would consist of one-
fifth of the property obtained from a contemplated divorce action. The contingent fea-
ture of the contract was not discussed in the opinion, however, as the contract was held
void as against public policy on the ground that it was a contract intended to promote
the dissolution of the marriage.
9 Jordan v. Westerman, 62 Mich. 170, 180 N.W. 826, 830 (1886).
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a failure of the parties to effect a reconciliation. In the Smith case,"0
the court adopted this general rule and held that a contract which is
void and unenforcible is not "sanctioned by law" as that term is used
in Canon 13; consequently, it is a violation of Canon 13 for an attorney
to enter into such a contract. Where the contingent fee contract is
related to the amount of support money and alimony awarded to the
wife, as was the case here, there is the additional objection that such
a contract would interfere with the duties qf the court.
In fixing the amount and time of payment of support money and alimony,
the court is entitled to have all the facts which would influence its decision.
It is also entitled to be free from side agreements which would frustrate the
court's effort to make suitable provision for the wife without undue burden
on the husband."1
JOAN SMITH
Conduct of Lawyer before the Court-Candor. In a trial on a breach of contract
action, the attorney, testifying on behalf of his client, stated that he had paid the cost of
a title insurance policy, but did not reveal to the court that he had requested the
insurance company to hold his check until the outcome of the trial. In a disciplinary
proceeding, In re Healy, 143 Wash. Dec. 247, 261 P.2d 89 (1953), the court held that
while the attorney did not testify falsely before the trial court, he failed to exercise the
candor which is required of him as an attorney. The attorney was suspended from
practice for ninety days.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
Tort Liability. In its national aspect the tort liability of a municipal
corporation presents an area of confusion, contradiction, and lack of
uniformity. The field is one of refinement, 'illogic, and apparently
capable of resolution only by legislative enactment. In 1953 the Wash-
ington Court rendered three significant decisions which serve to clarify
our position on the subject. These three cases, in their order of dis-
cussion, are McLeod v. Grant County School Dist.,' Kilbourn v. City
of Seattle,' and Hutton v. Martin.'
The general common law rule relating to the tort liability of a muni-
cipal corporation is: a municipal corporation is liable for torts com-
mitted by its agents in the performance of proprietary function, but,
in the absence of statute, it is not responsible for torts committed in
10 Supra note 1.
11 In re Smith, 42 Wn.2d 188, 254 P.2d 464, 469 (1953).
142 Wn.2d 316, 252 P.2d 360 (1953).
2 143 Wash. Dec. 345, 261 P.2d 407 (1953).
3 41 Wn.2d 780, 252 P.2d 581 (1953).
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